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Automation and the Labor Force
Loren Nerhus
ABSTRACT. Technological progress has been the catalyst behind the increases in living
standards across time. One aspect of technological progress is automation. Automation,
more than other technologies, has significant effects on the labor force. From World War
II until now, routine tasks have largely been automated. Perceptive tasks have belonged
mainly to the domain of human labor until very recent innovations. These innovations may
change the labor force, as new employment opportunities will not replace jobs as quickly
as the old ones are automated.
The number of labor hours needed to produce the goods in the U.S. economy will
soon decrease significantly. This has both short-term and long-term implications. In the
short-term, those with the right skills will benefit financially, while those with the wrong
skills will not reap this bountiful harvest. In response to this, it is imperative to continually
educate society to match skills with the level of technology. In the long-term, it is
theoretically possible to automate all of human labor. If that occurs, then the economic
problem would be solved, and resources could be distributed equally.

I. Introduction
“A car that is able to see, to calculate, to think, and can respond
to what it encounters. Even if that means completely stopping
itself. It’s the stuff of science fiction--minus the fiction. The 2014
E-class, the most intelligent E-class ever.”
-2014 Mercedes-Benz E-Class Advertisement
Humans’ ability to see, calculate, think, and respond is what makes
them able to perform many tasks better than anything else. Now humans
make machines, such as the new Mercedes-Benz car, that have perceptive
abilities similar to humans. This advancement is changing the structure
of human labor. The change is tremendously beneficial, but also contains
downsides that need to be addressed. One possible conclusion after an
inspection of the evidence is that aggregate labor hours will decrease in
the future, even if aggregate demand increases. As this happens, society
should renew its emphasis on education. This may seem like futuristic
science fiction, but as the advertisement claims, these scientific ideas are
taking shape sooner than once thought. As they do, the economic
landscape will change with it.
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II. Technological Advancement and Creative Destruction
Improvements in technology drive the increase in living standard in a
society (Sachs and McArthur 2002, 157). The United States is currently
the world leader in technological advancement as a consequence of an
extensive patent system that correctly rewards those who create valuable
products (Sachs and McArthur 2002, 168). These innovations make work
less taxing, living conditions more comfortable, and health care more
extensive. Even though everyone in society benefits from improvements
in technology, it does create negative externalities for some segments in
the short run.
For example, when the assembly line was introduced, it caused
unemployment for the craftsmen and artisans who made the product from
start to finish. The technological improvement, the assembly line, created
more value for society, but destroyed jobs for some. This phenomena is
known as creative destruction. Creative destruction is the natural
consequence of an innovation (Frey and Osborne 2013, 5-6). This makes
jobs and business models obsolete. In the long-run, however, even
workers whose professions are taken away by new technology are
gainfully employed (Sachs and McArthur 2002, 158). Historically, the
benefits of technological improvements are spread throughout most of
society. The Industrial Revolution is an example of how this occurs (Frey
and Osborne 2013, 7).
Automation is the newest technological revolution. Automated
machines are now taking over jobs previously done by humans.
Continuing with the example from above, workers on the assembly line
are replaced by machines that make the product from start to finish.
In the past, the bulk of the population moved up in real income when
new industries were created. From 1969-1999, however, the blue-collar
workforce in the US dropped from 56 percent of the population to 39
percent of the population (Levy and Murnane 2004, 41). Service workers,
typically associated with low skills and low pay, increased by 2.3
percentage points. On the other hand, sales, technicians, professionals,
and managers also grew modestly as a percentage of the labor force.
These segments of the economy are usually associated with higher pay
and more training. Overall during this time period, real living conditions
increased as a society. Creative Destruction, however, created some
“losers” in the market place (Levy and Murnane 2004, 35-36).
Human labor is changing with technology. It is important to know
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how it is changing and what society can do to best adapt to the new
environment. Creative Destruction shows that there are downsides for the
economy due to increases in automation. Sachs and MacArthur show that
nations that innovate have the highest income and are better off than the
rest of the world. The second tier of nations that adapt the technology
quickly have rising income, but still significantly trail the innovators. If
a country neither innovates nor adapts well, it is left behind in poverty.
“The top 20 patenting countries in the world, with less than 15% of the
world’s population and 77% of its GNP, account for 99% of all the
patenting in the U.S.” (Sachs and McArthur 2002, 166). This clearly
shows an advantage for technological innovators. It is important to see
how this innovation is coming about, as well as how the US labor market
will change because of it. As the labor market changes, educational and
social changes will occur with it.
Human-labor tasks can be separated into five broad categories.
Listing them least valued financially to most, in general, they are service
tasks, routine mental, routine physical, complex communication, and
expert thinking (Levy and Murnane 2004, 47-48). Separating the labor
force into five broad task categories might produce confusion. One
specific job might employ all of these skills, and most use at least two of
them. A plumber, for instance, does all five. He completes a service task
by communicating with a concerned human and assuring that the problem
can be fixed. He uses expert thinking to identify patterns in physical
places that are different in each house, and identifies the problem. Once
the problem is identified, he uses routine mental and physical processes
to fix the specific problem.
The categorization of each task is not always applicable. This
certainly creates a limitation, but these categories can provide a structured
framework to analyze automation more effectively.

III. Automation Defined
Automation is an “automatically controlled operation of an apparatus,
process, or system by mechanical or electronic devices that take the place
of human labor” (Merriam-Webster). There are two subsets within
automation.
One subset is logic-based automation, which employs “if, then, do”
statements to complete tasks (Levy and Murnane 2004, 57-58). In human
terms, these are routine tasks. Manufacturing is the essence of the routine

68

Major Themes in Economics, Spring 2014

physical task. Routine mental tasks vary greatly. Some examples are fraud
detection, loan approval, and a bank teller. Search engines respond to
routine queries using linear deduction (Frey and Osborne 2013, 16).
Personal computers easily automate routine mental tasks, while industrial
machines automate routine physical tasks. The comparative advantage
tips in the direction of automation for logic-based tasks. This is why blue
collar workers have seen a substantial decrease as a share of the
population, and will continue to as time moves forward.
The other subset of automation is perception. Humans are masters at
both physical and mental perception, and it is a challenge to program a
machine to do the same (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012, 12-14).
Perceptive tasks include service skills, complex communication, and
expert thinking. These broad tasks are more prevalent in the US labor
market, as routine automation has taken shape in recent years.
Levy and Murnane assumed that these jobs would not be automated
(Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012, 12-14). Until recently, it was reasonable
to assume that only easily programmable, routine jobs would be
automated. Recent advances in automation cast doubt upon this
assumption (Frey and Osborne 2013, 3). Before delving into how these
recent technologies will change the labor market of the future, it is
necessary to establish how the labor market has changed up until now
through automation.

IV. Past and Present Analysis—Routine Automation
A. BENEFITS
As was outlined previously, technological changes make work less
difficult and improve living standards. Computers are the driving force
behind automating routine mental tasks. The U.S. economy has benefited
from the increase in the use of computers. Some of these routine mental
tasks were not even conceivable beforehand. Some computations that
computers do are impossible by hand. The share of economic growth
attributable to computers has increased over time (Jorgenson and Stiroh
2000, 126-127). Average Labor Productivity grew immensely in the
1990’s, mostly due to advances in information technology. Information
technology is an automated transportation of information. “The diffusion
of IT improves business practices, generates spillover benefits, and raises
productivity throughout the economy” (Jorgenson and Stiroh 2000, 126-
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127).
IT was the basis for the large increases in productivity in the 90’s as
well as into the 21st century. In fact, labor productivity grew at an
average of 2.5% per year from 2000-2009, besting every decade since the
1960’s (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012, 30). This is surprising, given the
economic downturn that the economy experienced at the beginning and
end of that decade. The labor productivity growth is consistent with
Moore’s law, which says hardware processors will double in effectiveness
every eighteen months (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012, 17-18).
The US economy has also seen the automation of routine physical
tasks, which has increased profits for firms. It has increased the demand
for complex communication skills for managers. Prior to automation,
managers would give direct orders to their employees, and expected silent
obedience in return. Consider the assembly line example. If someone
could give clear directions on how to place the windshield into a car, he
would be a good manager. Each task needed clear directions. The
communication was not complex, merely “if, then, do” directions. Some
of these tasks have been automated over time. Managers now
communicate to their workers in a more understanding way, needing to
listen and perceive as well as communicate clearly, instead of only the
latter (Levy and Murnane 2004, 93-94). This demonstrates that the
demand for complex communication has increased, while the demand for
low-skilled manual tasks has decreased.
As outlined above, routine automation along with technological
improvements have caused a skill-biased technical change. Skill-biased
technical change is the change in the demand for workers. The demand
for higher skills has increased in recent decades, causing the income of
those individuals with marketable skills to rise (Autor, Katz, and Krueger
1998, 1169). As monotonous tasks are automated, more complex tasks
require more education. “…the relative demand for more-skilled workers
grew more rapidly during the past 26 years (1970-1996) than during the
previous three decades (1940-1970)” (Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998,
1171). There is a strong correlation between the “relative utilization of
more-skilled workers” and the use of new technologies across and within
industries (Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998, 1171). Nearly every sector of
the economy has experienced this shift. As the demand for these workers
has grown, the supply has grown in step. US culture has changed in its
assessment of what an adequate educational attainment should be. This
attitude change is the supply curve shift to meet the demand shift, as
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Americans have chosen more education levels each successive decade
since World War II (Fernald and Jones 2014, 5).
B. COSTS
Levy and Murnane point out that the unskilled jobs of the past have been
replaced by skilled positions. Those with fewer skills, however, no longer
have middle-class jobs and must accept lower-income jobs. Aside from
the recent recession and its aftermath, employment opportunities have
changed with the advent of automation. Even though routine jobs have
been replaced by machines, non-routine employment opportunities have
not been replaced. Indeed, they have grown. The problem is the increase
in low-paying service jobs (Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998, 1173-1181).
“… among the least educated and lowest paid categories of employment,
the share of US labor hours in service occupations grew by 30 percent
between 1980 and 2005 after having been flat or declining in the three
prior decades” (Autor and Dorn 2013, 1555).
Rising inequality in the United States has been the subject of much
debate recently (Mankiw 2013, 21-34). Part of this rising inequality has
to do with the divergence of labor demand, according to most experts
(Autor, Katz, and Krueger 1998, 1169). This is not to say that the income
inequality increase is only due to automation-driven labor change, but that
it is a contributing factor. The most compelling evidence is an analysis of
within-industry labor dynamics. Industries that have the largest
technological share also have the largest contribution to skill-biased
change.
Ed Wolff argues that the top 20% of the current income distribution
received all of the benefits of the growth in the economy from 1983-2009.
The bottom 80% actually saw a net decrease in wealth (Brynjolfsson and
McAfee 2012, 34). This indicates a shrinking middle class. Automation
is one explanation as to why this is occurring. Again, as routine tasks are
automated, demand increases for higher skills, and blue collar workers
either acquire the technological skills required, or are relegated to lowerpaying service jobs. In contrast to what was said earlier about general
technological advancement, it now seems that only some of the
population directly benefit. In general, previous technologies supplement
human labor, whereas automation replaces human labor.
Another theory is the outsourcing of jobs. Because the United States
has an open economy, firms outsource jobs to places with cheaper labor.
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The cheaper labor produces the same product at a fraction of the wage of
a middle class American. It is popular for politicians and media to blame
outsourcing for many US labor problems. Mitt Romney famously told the
“lie of the year” in 2012, claiming that Chrysler was planning to move
Jeep production to China (Adair 2013). The statement was based on some
truth, and the general concern holds merit. There has been an outsourcing
of call-centers to India, which has run parallel with the automation of
other call centers (Levy and Murnane 2004, 84). Closer to home,
Newton’s Maytag outsourced all of its jobs in Iowa, mostly to Mexico
(Margolis and Mullins 2011). These examples contribute to the shrinking
blue-collar workforce. Certainly, there are other reasons that may
contribute to the widening gap between rich and poor, but the point of this
section was to narrow down most of the explanation to these two theories.

V. Future Automation—Perceptive Tasks
A. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
It is impossible to predict the future, and difficult to speculate about it
with accuracy. With this in mind, it is also dangerous to be struck off
guard by changes in the economic landscape. The employment rate, as
well as the labor force participation rate, have decreased drastically due
to the recession in 2007-2009. The economy and the financial world have
recovered since the end of that recession, but employment opportunities
have not recovered (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012, 2-5). Brynjolfsson
and McAfee suggest that the lack of recovery in employment could be due
to automation (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012, 7-9). The historical
evidence suggests that general technological innovation does not reduce
overall employment. This may be changing as new innovations in
automation take shape.
The difference between previous and current automation is in the
types of tasks machines are now able to do. Previously, machines could
only do routine tasks. Recent innovations, however, have shown that this
assumption of routine-only machines is now in peril (Frey and Osborne
2013, 23). In Jeopardy!, IBM supercomputer Watson handily defeated the
top trivia players in the world (Valerie 2011). This feat proved that nonroutine cognitive tasks can be automated. Watson is now servicing
patients at a hospital, recognizing patterns, and prescribing treatments
(Frey and Osborne 2013, 17).
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Expert thinking requires a “schema” (Levy and Murnane 2004, 63).
The essence of a schema is building up a mass of long-term knowledge.
It is embedded into our brains over years of study. To be an expert in a
field, an assortment of knowledge related to the subject must be readily
available to the active part of the brain. Also, this assortment of
knowledge must be put into practice through experiences directly related
to the subject. Medical doctors are an example of this. They do four years
of undergraduate school, four years of medical school, and finish with
training in residence with the oversight of more experienced doctors.
IBM’s Watson is the first computer to be able to come up with answers
through a “schema.” It can diagnose patients effectively, as if it had the
extensive training of a medical doctor.
Another example is the driverless car developed by Google, which
has even surpassed the Mercedes-Benz vehicle mentioned in the
introduction (Frey and Osborne 2013, 3). Only ten years ago, the example
of driving a car was an “extreme” version of what only humans could do
(Levy and Murnane 2004, 13-30). The driverless car is only the beginning
of non-routine tasks that computers will be able to do better than humans
in the near future.
Other examples of perceptive behavior are Google Now and Apple’s
Siri. Although they are similar to previous search engines, they are
tapping into the internet’s resources to customize answers. An example
that Frey and Osborne give is Baxter, a robot that can be trained to do
physical tasks. It is limited in its motions in comparison to a human, but
is an advancement in regard to physical automation. There is also
development of robots that can do repairs that are unsafe for humans
(Frey and Osborne 2013, 18). These robots are breaking grounding in the
area of physical perception tasks.
The DARPA Robotics Challenge last year demonstrated these
advancements. The winning robot, Shaft, especially made advances to do
the sort of physical perception tasks that humans do every day in the
workplace. “It has driven a small jeep-like car over a short, twisting
course, walked over ramps, steps and rubble, negotiated various
doorways, cleared debris from its path, cut a hole in a wall with a power
tool, connected a fire hose and shut off a series of valves” (The Economist
2014).
Based on these observations, Frey and Osborne discuss the future of
employment frankly: “We argue that it is largely already technologically
possible to automate almost any task, provided that sufficient amounts of
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data are gathered for pattern recognition” (Frey and Osborne 2013, 23) As
the cost of these machines decrease, so will the incentive for firms to
invest in them instead of human capital. If the annual cost of labor is
greater than the annual cost to hold and retain these machines for a
specific task, then the task will be automated. 47 percent of the US labor
market is currently susceptible to automation (Frey and Osborne 2013,
44).
Brynjolfsson and McAfee state that not only is technological progress
increasing, but that it will exponentially increase relative to what has
happened thus far, and that this will be a structural shift in how labor is
arranged. They argue that technological innovation will surpass anything
we could ever imagine. They demonstrate that as new ideas come about,
more combinations of ideas are possible. As Moore’s law plays out, the
hardware that is the foundation of automation will continue to be faster,
more affordable, and of better quality. Technological output, they argue,
is an exponentially increasing function mathematically (Brynjolfsson and
McAfee 2012, 18-21).
Not surprisingly, there are views that differ from those outlined
above. Fernald and Jones argue that the future of US economic growth is,
and will be, slower than it was for the sixty years after World War II.
Since education in the United States has lagged behind other countries in
recent years, so will its economy (Fernald and Jones 2014, 5). Poor future
growth prospects give an alternative explanation as to why the US has
observed poor employment figures since the financial crisis of 2008. They
also suggest an alternative view of ideas and technological process. The
“fishing out” argument explains that new ideas are more difficult to come
about as time moves on. This theory suggests that there is a stopping point
to how much innovation can be introduced into the economy (Fernald and
Jones 2014, 7). This may only be possible, however, if we go the way of
the Amish.
Yet even Fernald and Jones admit that, “In the limit, if capital can
replace labor entirely, growth rates could explode, with incomes
becoming infinite in finite time” (Fernald and Jones 2014, 8). This
statement is mathematical and theoretical of course. It shows that all else
equal, the more society automates, the higher the GDP per person will be.
B. THE END OF WORK THEORY
At the turn of the 20th century, there was significant evidence that the
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use of the horse as a means of production was coming to an end.
Interestingly, 1901 was the peak year for the number of horses used in
production (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012, 37). In a similar manner, the
labor force participation rate peaked in the year 2000 in the US. At the
time, Jeremy Rifkin’s “end of work” theory seemed fringe at best. Since
that year, the labor force participation rate has declined steadily. A quick
glance at the data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics shows this to be the
case, as the total percentage of the adult population at work has dropped
from 67.3 percent in 2000, to 63 percent today (USBLS 2014).
Recent information demonstrates this too. Between September 2013
and the end of February 2014, the US created 900,000 new jobs (Lazear
2014). A closer inspection shows that the amount of work done by human
labor actually decreased. This is because the average work week declined
by .3 hours. This may seem minuscule, but it is equivalent to one million
lost jobs, for a net decrease of 100,000 equivalent jobs (Lazear 2014).
These numbers may add some validity to Rifkin’s idea, as well as
Brynjolfsson and MacAfee’s argument.
In the past, economists have projected a shorter work week in
response to the improvements in efficiency and technology. Instead of
less work for the same amount of “stuff”, humans tend to consume more.
As humans demand more, it may be possible to produce those goods
through automation. If so, this would either create a shorter work week or
a decreasing labor force participation rate.
Historically, there has been a significant decrease in the length of the
average work week. In 1850, the average work week was 66 hours, but by
1956, it declined to the typical 40 hour work week (Zeisel 1958, 23-29).
This trend has continued, as the average work week has fallen to 34.2
hours, even though the labor force participation rate rose throughout
much of the 20th century (Lazear 2014). A large part of the decrease in
the length of the work week has been due to labor laws and collective
bargaining. The reason this was possible without damaging the economy,
however, was technological advances.

VI. Implications
The pace at which innovation is increasing is higher than it was before,
making it more difficult to adjust to the new skills needed for
employment. Firms are beginning to automate tasks that they previously
could not. Expert thinking and service tasks may be the next to be

Nerhus: Automation and the Labor Force

75

automated. The race between the automation of perceptive physical tasks
and perceptive mental tasks is important. If expert thinking tasks are
automated, it may drive society to be less educated. Service jobs do not
require as much education as expert thinking tasks, so the costs of
advancing in school would be greater than the reward. This would create
negative externalities, such as an uninformed electorate, among other
things. If service tasks are automated first, then the demand for higher
skills will increase, creating a more educated society.
It seems reasonable that some expert thinking will be automated, but
humans will be needed to make the right decision for at least the time
being. New innovations will make the decisions more effective and
complete. Adjusting away from incorrect past decisions and changing
course is still done best by humans. This re-examination of past decisions
is called metacognition (Levy and Murnane 2004, 57-59). That does not
mean that humans are good at it per se, but that the current supercomputer
technology has not yet caught up. Supercomputers like Watson may have
schema, but their ability to use metacognition still lags behind humans.
Humans will also need to be able to communicate effectively with each
other. Building trusting relationships and solving problems with each
other seems to be the future of work. As Moore’s law plays out, the
effectiveness of computers in this area will also increase, making them
even better at expert thinking than humans. As for service tasks, the
advances in artificial intelligence and robotics may make automation
possible in the near future.
Imagine going into a restaurant where the order is taken by a machine,
made by a machine, and delivered to you by a robot. Compare this
scenario to our current experience. Most people would prefer human
interaction over the coldness of a machine-run service. Humans generally
prefer human interaction, even if it is not perfect. The machines will need
to significantly decrease the cost of production to allow this to happen. If
the prices of the fast food, machine-run restaurants decrease significantly
more than food served by humans, then customers may make
compromises.
In either case, the evidence suggests that automation will reduce the
aggregate labor hours needed in the United States in the near future. The
way in which this takes form remains to be seen. Past shifts in the demand
for labor can help with projecting into the future. Those with the right
skills will be gainfully employed and enjoy increased income, and those
with the wrong set of skills will be relegated to the unemployed ranks.
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Many of the new “jobs” created in the economy will be given to
computers, not human workers.
One way in which the aggregate hours could be reduced is through
the labor force participation rate continuing to fall. The trend in the U.S.
is to have full-time workers put in more hours, while part-time workers
become unemployed, or work fewer hours than they desire (Jacobs and
Green 1998, 442-444). An alternative would be to decrease the number
of hours required for a full-time worker. The work week could be
reduced, spreading the required aggregate labor hours to more of the
public. If automation proves to reduce the amount of aggregate labor, this
might be the correct course of action. Firms naturally try to minimize
cost, and so might oppose shortening their full-time employees’ work
week.
This also demonstrates that those without capital to invest, as well as
those who do not have the education to be gainfully employed in the
modern labor market, will share in little of the economic spoils of
automation. Unless a different path is charted out, there will be a segment
of the population left out of the immense benefits that automation could
bring to a society. To be clear, this is speculation about the distribution
of benefits due to automation, not about the value of long-run benefits to
society as a whole.
Progressives may suggest redistributing wealth as inequality rises.
Not only is this approach reactive, but it also could do harm to the
framework that has allowed the United States to be the leader in
innovation. As was touched on before, the patent system in the USA is
essential, because the ability of innovators to profit from their creation in
the market is crucial to its sustainability. If the incentives in this system
are taken away, then so will the long-term benefits.
In order to give all segments of the population an opportunity to reap
those benefits, it is important to renew emphasis on education. As more
jobs are automated, the jobs that will be available will be related to
complex communication and expert thinking. The demand for these labor
qualities must be met with a labor force that is highly educated. The
future labor force will need empathetic people skills, even as screens take
over the world. The ability to effectively communicate emotional and
intellectual messages will be key across industries. The inequality of
opportunity is not efficient, and is not desirable for any society. As
income inequality naturally grows due to the demand for skilled labor, the
US should renew its focus on education (Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2012,
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62-63).
The above ideas are an analysis of the labor force in the short to
intermediate term. Imagine for a moment, the long-term effects of
automation. Moore’s law indicates that technology will double in
effectiveness in relation to price every eighteen months. If this proves to
be true moving forward, and the recent innovations continue to develop,
there is not a job that could not be automated. Over time, the price of the
capital will decline relative to the price of labor, and therefore capital may
replace labor. If this occurs as an economy-wide phenomena, then
complete automation will take place. Under the current system, those who
own the capital would reap all of the benefits, and those who do not
would reap none of it. The main problem with communism currently is
the inability to give enough incentive for people to work. If work is not
required for the production of the goods we need, then the distribution of
those goods could eventually become equal, because the downside of
communism would not exist.
Socially, there could be significant downsides. Humans naturally
derive joy from being interactive as social beings. Since deepening the
most rewarding relationships can be difficult, many may choose
interacting with a screen instead. Automation will make this easier. This
social expense is a downside that ought to be considered as society moves
toward automation. If the derivation of joy is the point of life, it is wise
to be wary of how we choose to interact with technology, and each other,
as time moves on.

VII. Conclusion
The United States is a global leader in innovation. These innovations have
led to rising standards of living for everyone over time. Innovations in
routine tasks allow the automation of these tasks. This is largely already
happening. Some of the consequences are a shrinking middle class
through skill-biased technical change. The next wave of automated
innovation is in perceptive tasks, which may automate both low-skill
service tasks and higher skilled tasks. As these take shape in the coming
years, structural unemployment will increase, and the share of employed
Americans will decrease. As this comes about, it is important to boost
American educational levels to keep pace with changes in technology. It
is important to be wary of the social downsides to automation, as well as
to keep in mind that there could be a final destination to automation,
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where machines may replace labor entirely.
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